

REPORT

ON THE INQUIRY SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF MIR RAZA ALI

(Deceased on July 29, 2026; Case FIR No. 795/2026, Police Station Ferozabad, Karachi)

Submitted by:

JUSTICE OMAR SIAL

Judge, Sindh High Court

Head, Single-Member Judicial Commission of Inquiry

Submitted to:

The Chief Minister of Sindh

Government of Sindh, Karachi

Date of Submission: October [15], 2026

Table of Contents

TOR 1: To examine the exact facts and circumstances leading to and surrounding the death of Mir Raza Ali.	3
Background	4
A brief history of Mir Raza	6
<i>Education & Early Independence</i>	6
<i>His Persona</i>	6
<i>The Vision Behind Wafflix</i>	6
Chronology of Events	7
Suicide vs. Murder Controversy	25
Suicide because of financial distress	26
<i>Creditors/Investors</i>	26
<i>General Comment</i>	32
<i>List of creditors</i>	32
<i>Ali Shaz Voice Note</i>	33
<i>WhatsApp message sent to Sarim Bin Tahir</i>	33
<i>CCTV footage showing Mir Raza taking a pistol from Wafflix</i>	34
<i>Parents' relationship and financial distress</i>	34
Binance and Cryptocurrency	34
The meeting at the Chief Minister's House	35
Special Medical Board formation controversy	36
TOR 2: Determine whether the investigation is being conducted impartially and in accordance with law, and identify any investigative angle or evidence requiring further investigation.	38
The Investigation	39
<i>The place where the dead body was found</i>	40
<i>CCTV Evidence Collection</i>	43
<i>The mobile phone</i>	47
<i>The Apple Watch</i>	48
<i>Vehicles</i>	48
<i>Paperwork</i>	48
<i>Samples</i>	49
<i>Leakage of digital data</i>	49
A broad overview of the investigation	49
Investigative angle or evidence requiring further investigation	50

TOR 3: Determine whether any police officer, MLO, or any other official committed negligence, dereliction of duty, professional misconduct, suppression/manipulation of evidence, or any unlawful act, omission, or cover-up.	52
Observations on the police and health officials	53
TOR 4: Make recommendations for further investigation, forensic analysis, or legal/departamental action.	58
Recommendations	59

TOR 1: To examine the exact facts and circumstances leading to and surrounding Mir Raza Ali's death.

Background

Mir Raza was a young businessman and entrepreneur. In the early hours of 28 July 2026, he left home. CCTV showed him boarding a taxi at about 4:09 AM, alighting near Gulistan-e-Jauhar at about 4:28 AM, and continuing on foot. When communication ceased later that morning, his family and friends became concerned and initiated a search.

On 29 July 2026, Mir Raza's body was found in the bushes opposite the University of Karachi near the Shahi Qila Ground in Gulistan-i-Jauhar, Karachi, with a firearm injury. After a post-mortem examination, police began investigating. Suicide soon became the dominant explanation, but the family maintained that he had been murdered and repeatedly challenged its basis.

The controversy extended beyond the medical evidence. The family alleged that police promoted suicide and selectively shared details of Mir Raza's private life, finances, and relationships with the media. They said this shaped public perception and harmed the family's reputation before the cause of death was established. In their view, it shifted attention from unanswered questions about his death to alleged personal, financial, or relationship difficulties, making the disclosures central to the controversy over the investigation and public suicide narrative.

The suicide narrative faced further scrutiny over the initial post-mortem examination. The Police Surgeon identified 14 significant deficiencies, including the recording of the firearm injury, identification of entry and exit wounds, photographic documentation, and projectile trajectory. The investigating officer did not receive the report until 3 August 2026, and the Police Surgeon advised exhumation and re-examination.

A Special Medical Board was formed, and the body was exhumed. The second examination noted additional injuries and identified the firearm entry wound

differently. These discrepancies increased uncertainty about the original explanation and required careful, independent review of the medical evidence.

Other evidence also raised questions. An empty bullet casing found near the body reportedly did not match test rounds from the security guard's registered weapon, and a pistol holster was recovered nearby. Investigators needed to assess these items alongside CCTV and other firearm evidence.

CCTV and digital evidence were central to reconstructing Mir Raza's movements. Investigators recovered his mobile phone and Apple Watch and collected footage from several locations. Questions later arose because some footage was filmed from display screens rather than obtained from the original systems, and concerns also covered the handling of digital evidence and biological samples.

The case therefore raised unresolved questions about the basis and public presentation of the suicide narrative; disclosure of private communications and resulting reputational harm; conflicting medical and ballistic evidence; handling of CCTV, digital, and biological evidence; and the conduct and documentation of the initial investigation.

Together, these issues required an independent, comprehensive examination. A Judicial Commission was needed to assess the circumstances of Mir Raza's death and the evidence as a whole, including how the initial explanation developed and was communicated, how evidence was handled, and how the investigation was conducted.

Accordingly, on 24 August 2026, the Sindh Government established a Judicial Commission to independently and comprehensively examine Mir Raza's death amid competing accounts, disputed evidence, and concerns about the initial investigation.

The Commission started work on August 27, 2026, and continued recording statements till October 7, 2026. In 20 sessions, the Commission recorded

statements from 50 witnesses. The Commission also comprehensively explored the crime scene and its adjoining areas on October 5, 2026. To ensure transparency and reduce public speculation, the Commission held all sessions open to the public.

The following is an analysis of what the Commission learned during its Sessions.

A brief history of Mir Raza

Education & Early Independence

Born on 8 December 2000, Mir Raza Ali Khan studied at the Habib Public School, completed his A-Levels at Alpha College, and later attended IBA Karachi. As a student, Raza had an independent and entrepreneurial mindset. He worked as a Teaching Assistant, checked academic papers, gave tuitions, and explored small business opportunities, gradually using his own earnings to fund his entrepreneurial ambitions.

His Persona

Raza was known as a people's person - energetic, ambitious, social, and deeply driven by ideas. He enjoyed meeting people, understanding markets, and finding practical solutions. His approach, personally and professionally, centred on conversation and collaboration. He readily shared business ideas, strategies, and connections with others, and he was particularly enthusiastic about helping young entrepreneurs grow. At 25, he was constantly thinking ahead — about his business, his responsibilities, and what he wanted to build next.

The Vision Behind Wafflix

The idea of Wafflix emerged in 2020 when Raza and his childhood best friend, Ahmed Bhardey, decided to build something of their own. As equal partners, they

combined the concept of waffles with a distinctive, Netflix-inspired theme, starting with limited resources and a small cart in Gulshan-e-Iqbal.

What started as one cart gradually grew into three. The partners took Wafflix into major food festivals, including Karachi Eat, while simultaneously expanding into events and catering. As the brand grew, the cart-based model evolved into permanent outlets. By 2026, Wafflix had two dine-in outlets in Bahadurabad and North Nazimabad, along with two Foodpanda kitchens (cloud kitchens) in Defence and Johar, allowing the business to serve customers across Karachi. Its menu had also grown from a handful of products to 200+ items.

Throughout this journey, Raza and his partner remained the two principal partners behind Wafflix, dividing responsibilities and contributing to different aspects of its operations and growth. For Raza, however, Karachi was never intended to be the final destination. He envisioned expanding Wafflix into other cities across Pakistan, turning an idea that began with a single cart into a much larger homegrown brand.

Chronology of Events

Date	Time	Proceedings
27.07.2026	11:24 p.m.	Mir Raza receives a call from Raziq (30 sec)
27.07.2026	11:30 p.m.	Mir Raza calls Ahmed Bhardey (29 sec)
27.07.2026	11:38 p.m.	Mir Raza receives a call from Raziq (58 sec)
27.07.2026	11:39 p.m.	Mir Raza calls Ahmed Bhardey (55 sec)
27.07.2026	11:43 p.m.	Mir Raza receives a call from Raziq (2 sec)
27.07.2026	11:49 p.m.	Mir Raza calls Sarim Bin Tahir (168 sec)

Date	Time	Proceedings
27.07.2026	Sometime after 11:52 p.m.	Mir Raza sends a WhatsApp message to Sarim asking for Rs. 3 crore, saying something is supposed to happen in the morning and he is not ready.
28.07.2026	Between midnight and 1:30 a.m.	Mir Raza has a meal with Raziq at Ghaffar Kebab House.
28.07.2026	2:13 a.m.	Mir Raza calls Ali Jumani (42 sec)
28.07.2026	2:16 a.m.	Mir Raza receives a call from Ali Jumani (75 sec)
28.07.2026	2:23 a.m.	Mir Raza receives a call from Abdullah Bhardey (201 sec)
28.07.2026	About 3:00 a.m.	Social media accounts were deactivated, which likely caused Salwa distress and concern. She started calling and messaging on WhatsApp, which went unanswered till 3:58 am.
28.07.2026	3:57 a.m.	Bykea driver Ahsanullah receives an online ride booking from Mir Raza's mobile number.
28.07.2026	About 4:00 a.m.	Mir Raza books a Bykea ride
28.07.2026	4:02 a.m.	Ahmed Bharday exchanges messages with Mir Raza on WhatsApp, and Mir Raza responds but still does not respond to Salwa Khan.
28.07.2026	4:07:26 a.m.	Ahsanullah calls Mir Raza from Chase Value, Block-2, PECHS.

Date	Time	Proceedings
28.07.2026	4:09 a.m.	Salwa Khan calls Hasem and reports that Mir Raza's social media accounts, including Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, and Facebook, were deleted. By this time, WhatsApp was also deleted.
28.07.2026	4:11 a.m.	Chase Value CCTV (later found by Mir Hussain) shows Mir Raza sitting on the front seat of a car.
28.07.2026	4:20 –4:22 a.m.	Mir Raza's WhatsApp is found deleted; Salwa Khan calls Mir Raza 8 times on SIM, but there is no response. During this period, Sheryar (employee) also calls but receives no response.
28.07.2026	4:25 a.m.	Mother Mariam Hussain, unable to reach Mir Raza, asks daughter Alishba to try. Alishba cannot reach him either and informs their father, Mir Hussain.
28.07.2026	4:28 a.m.	Mir Raza is dropped near United Chartered School, Block-3, Gulistan-e-Jauhar. Mir Raza is seen walking further towards University Road on Qilla-A Street.
28.07.2026	4:38:27 a.m.	Mir Raza last scene on CCTV installed on Hill View Road at a Rent a Car office.
28.07.2026	Morning (5:00 a.m. – 7:00 a.m)	Mir Hussain, with friends/workers Sheryar and Kazim, searches the area. He goes to P.S. Ferozabad, but no report is registered.
28.07.2026	5:45 a.m.	Mir Hussain reports the disappearance to Madadgar 15 and posts a missing notice with a photo on the MILAP app.

Date	Time	Proceedings
28.07.2026	6:30 a.m.	A neighbor's CCTV shows Mir Raza walking in the street.
28.07.2026	Between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.	Ahmed Bhardey, Abdullah Bhardey, and Raziq thoroughly searched Mir Raza's room.
28.07.2026	Between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.	Alishba opens Mir Raza's Apple Watch; notes are found on it, witnessed by all standing friends, and Abdullah Bhardey copies them to his phone by typing them.
28.07.2026	3:15 p.m.	After Mir Hussain's brother from Islamabad intervened, police registered an FIR at P.S. Ferozabad under Section 365 PPC against unknown persons.
28.07.2026	Around 5:30 p.m.	The gun of Security Guard Mazhar of Wafflix Bahadarabad is reported missing.
28.07.2026	Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and midnight	Sheryar accessed Wafflix CCTV on his mobile phone after receiving login details from Noman. Provides a CCTV clip to Ahmed and Abdullah Bhardey.

Date	Time	Proceedings
29.07.2026	About 2:30 a.m.	Mariam Hussain calls Hasem. Hasem, Abdullah Bharday, Ahmed Bharday, Wasay Bhardey, and Rafay Bhardey then visit the family home and show a video of Mir Raza taking a security guard's pistol from a drawer in his shop. He then locks the shop, sits in a car, and leaves.
29.07.2026	About 10:30 a.m.	Bykea provides a location link for the drop-off point. The family reaches the last location near Wafflix's cloud kitchen in Gulistan-e-Johar, where a guard says two suspected guest houses may hold clues.
29.07.2026	About 11:52 a.m.	Gardener Yasir and Qaiser find a dead body near Masjid-e-Khizra on Main University Road, Block-1, Gulistan-e-Johar, marking a critical point in the investigation.
29.07.2026	12:00 p.m.	Gardener Yasir calls 15
29.07.2026	12:24 p.m.	Muhammad Hanif and Victor Sarfaraz of 15 arrive.
29.07.2026	12:41 p.m.	ASI Azhar Abbas (P.S. Gulistan-e-Johar) reaches the scene, photographs the body, and sends the photos to the SHO. Sometime later, HC Zeeshan Haider arrives and calls Muhammad Arif, who carries a Talaash device.

Date	Time	Proceedings
29.07.2026	12:49 pm	Edhi ambulance staff Mohsin Shah and Javed Khan arrive, turn the body, and find a gunshot, underscoring the need for detailed investigation to clarify the circumstances of death. The body was removed with nursery employees. Police fail to identify it using the Talaash fingerprint device, and the body is shifted to Jinnah Hospital.
29.07.2026	Around 1:30 pm	Meanwhile, Mir Hussain shows Mir Raza's photo at a guest house. Three men run away, and the family enters and searches but does not find Mir Raza. They review CCTV from 28.07.2026 (from 3:50 a.m.). Guest house staff call P.S. Gulistan-e-Johar, and ASI Azhar Abbass arrives and tells the family a body has been recovered and shows pictures he took from his phone. The family is shown the photo and goes to Jinnah Hospital, where Mariam Hussain identifies the body as her son's by his clothes and body hair.
29.07.2026	2:37 p.m.	The body reaches Jinnah Hospital. SIP Nadeem Mughal arrives directly at JPMC and prepares an inspection memo at the mortuary in the presence of witnesses. Fills in Column 10 even before the post-mortem.

Date	Time	Proceedings
29.07.2026	3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.	Dr. Osama Sheikh takes the inquest report and conducts the post-mortem. He finds an entry wound on the left chest (1.8 x 1.6 cm, inverted margin, blackening) and an exit wound on the upper back (1 x 1.2 cm, everted). He estimates the body was 24 to 36 hours old, notes no fractures, and attributes death to hemorrhagic shock leading to cardiopulmonary arrest. He takes four samples, plus the shirt, and hands them to SIP Nadeem Mughal in sealed bags; the viscera report remains pending.
29.07.2026	Around 4 pm onwards	News of Mir Raza's dead body being found goes viral on social media.
29.07.2026	After postmortem	The body is released to the family and is taken for Ghusl at Martin Quarters.
29.07.2026	9.15 pm	Namaz-e-Janaza and burial are done.
29.07.2026	Near Midnight	Alishaz Mushtaq applies for an urgent Visa to Azerbaijan and purchases a ticket to Baku.
30.07.2026	Not stated	Nadeem Mughal hands the samples to PI Shabbir Leghari at P.S. Ferozabad.
30.07.2026	Not stated	Mir Raza's phone recovered by Police from two brothers, Sajid and Sajjad
31.07.2026	Not stated	Alishaz Mushtaq leaves for Baku.
31.07.2026	Around 1 am.	Police took Mir Raza's smartwatch from his family. Cryptic statements by police hinting at suicide.

Date	Time	Proceedings
31.07.2026	Not stated	A gun holster was discovered at the site where the body had been found, hanging from a tree, in the presence of a news channel;
31.07.2026	Not stated	Footage of Mir Raza walking was released. Suicide narrative starts building up through different comments and headlines.
01.08.2026	Not stated	Investigation Team constituted by Additional IGP Karachi Range vide No. Addl.IGP/Khi/Rdr/6100/-2026, comprising SSP CIA/SIU Samiullah Soomro, SSP East Zubair Nazir Sheikh and SP East Usman Sadozai; SIO Ferozabad Shabbir Leghari continued as I.O.
02.08.2026	Not stated	Dr. Osama added a note that no fractures were found on Page 2.
Between 01.08.2026 and 03.08.2026	Not Stated	Section 161 statements were recorded from multiple friends and colleagues of Mir Raza at PS Ferozabad, and all of them were warned not to meet the family, attend any protest, or post online about Mir Raza.
03.08.2026	Not stated	Police Surgeon Karachi Dr. Summaiya Syed, through letter PSK No. 1037-1039 to SSP East, identified 14 shortcomings in the provisional post-mortem report, advised exhumation, and called for an explanation from Dr. Osama Shaikh.
04.08.2026	10:00 pm	Police Surgeon appears on Geo and points out deficiencies in the post-mortem process.

Date	Time	Proceedings
04.08.2026	Not stated	Investigation Team released CCTV clips from the rear of Masjid-e-Khizra: one showed a scavenger around 8:00 a.m. on 29.07.2026; another showed a motorcyclist stopping at the spot between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. The letter states the motorcyclist had not been traced.
05.08.2026	Between 12:00 pm and 2:00 pm	Family meets AIG Azad Khan at KPO. Mid-conversation, AIG shows the family a PDF presentation on his iPad with screenshots and details from Mir Raza's smartwatch.
05.08.2026	From 2:30 p.m. to 7:10 p.m.	ASP Shahzeb Mushtaq CDR traces him in the vicinity of PS Ferozabad
05.08.2026	06:03 p.m.	ASP Shahzeb Mushtaq calls ASP Nida Junaid (10 min)
05.08.2026 and 06.08.2026	Not Stated	Alishaz Mushtaq returns to Karachi, meets ASP Nida Junaid, and gives her Mir Raza's 8-month-old voice note.
06.08.2026	Not Stated	The site where the body was found was set on fire. Bullet casing was found near the site but not from the burnt area.
06.08.2026	Not Stated	IG Sindh claims the case is solved and will reveal all details via a press conference in two days.

Date	Time	Proceedings
=On 06.08.2026	Not stated	Complainant Mir Hussain files an application under Section 176(2) Cr.PC (Crl. Misc. Application No. 55/2026) before the Judicial Magistrate XXI, Karachi East. Application allowed the same day.
06.08.2026	Not stated	The Magistrate orders a medico-legal board for exhumation. Police Surgeon Dr. Summaiya Syed forms the first Exhumation Board. The Director General Health Services Sindh then replaces it with a reconstituted board of Dow and LUMHS professors and police surgeons. A further order the same day lets the convener co-opt other experts.
06.08.2026	Not stated	Samples taken during the first post-mortem submitted for Chemical Examination with Lab
06.08.2026	Not stated	Parents submitted a formal complaint to the Police Surgeon Karachi and Secretary Health seeking inquiry/action against MLO Dr. Osama Shaikh; they were informed he had been removed from further MLO duty pending inquiry.
06.08.2026 — 07.08.2026	Not stated	Mir Raza's voice note to Alishaz Mushtaq leaked on TV.

Date	Time	Proceedings
07.08.2026	10:30 a.m.	The third order is served on the Police Surgeon via WhatsApp. Exhumation was fixed for this date, but the family expresses no confidence in the second board and asks for the first board instead. The Magistrate cancels the exhumation and writes a Report to the Secretary, Health, directing him to address the family's grievances.
07.08.2026	Late afternoon	The Secretary, Health restored the original Special Medical Board constituted by the Police Surgeon, as per the letter.
08.08.2026	11:00 a.m.	The exhumation is conducted in the presence of the Magistrate, the doctors, and I.O. Shabbir Leghari. Mir Hussain points out the grave; the family is asked to leave and wait outside the enclosed area. Magistrate and IO were allowed to stay.
08.08.2026	1:15 p.m.	Exhumation is completed.
08.08.2026	1:32 p.m.	The body is reburied. Samples were secured from Mir Raza, along with Blood samples of Mir Hussain and Mariam Hussain, sealed, and given to I.O. Shabbir Leghari. Shabbir Leghari prepared the 174 report, got the parents' signatures as witnesses, and again filled Column 10, claiming an entry wound on the chest and an exit on the back, before receiving any findings from the Special Medical Board.

Date	Time	Proceedings
08.08.2026	During Exhumation	The first audio of Complainant Mir Hussain with Noor leaks to the media. Then a media report attributed to the Investigation Team claims the Investigation is gaining access to the Khula file of Mir Raza's parents, and allegations between the spouses are aired on TV.
08.08.2026	8:00 p.m.	Provisional Report issued by Special Medical Board finding an entry wound at the back and an exit wound at the front, fractures on the skull and broken ribs, with other injuries. Family holds press conference demanding change of Investigation Team.
09.08.2026	Evening	Dr. Osama is called to CM House, where he goes along with his father. AIG Azad Khan, DIG Farrukh Lanjar, SSP Samiullah Soomro, and SSP Zubair Nazeer Sheikh are present. Dr. Osama's father tells those present that mistakes happen to everyone and asks what is in store for Dr. Osama, upon which he is told that good things are not in store for him.
09.08.2026	Not stated	SSP Samiullah Soomro's team was dissolved, and a new team was constituted vide AIGP Operations Order Ref. No. 39013-20/AIGP/OPS/RDR/2026 under DIG Crime & Investigation.
09.08.2026	Evening	Home Minister Sindh visited the family residence with the Mayor of Karachi and Additional IGP Karachi and conveyed the Government's proposal

Date	Time	Proceedings
		for a judicial commission; the family rejected the proposal and addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, Sindh High Court, on 10.08.2026.
10.08.2026	Afternoon- Evening	Family and Lawyer meet the new investigation team at Crime Branch. WhatsApp group is also formed for communication.
10.08.2026	Not stated	Forensic Report issued confirming bullet casing does not match test empties of weapon LA-1197
10.08.2026	Not stated	SHO Gulistan-e-Johar Kamran Afridi and DSP Shahrah-e-Faisal Arshad Afridi were suspended.
11.08.2026	Not Stated	The chemical report of the shirt revealed acid traces and abundant GSR on the back, but not on the front.
11.08.2026	Not Stated	Chemical Report of blood sample issued revealing bupivacaine found in blood.
11.08.2026	Not stated	Dr. Osama Sheikh issued his final opinion citing the Chemical Examination Report of samples sealed by Dr. Osama Sheikh, and excluded suicide as the manner of death.
11.08.2026	Not stated	Family and SSP RRF Syed Ali Raza visited the site. At least five empty bottles commonly used for selling hydrochloric acid were noticed; the Interim Challan claims two bottles were seized. No confirmation that these were the same bottles identified, or what their chemical report says.

Date	Time	Proceedings
11.08.2026	Not stated	At NCCIA, SSP Syed Ali Raza sought the deceased's sealed smart watch, seizure memo and papers from SSP Samiullah Soomro for forensic examination. SSP Samiullah Soomro stated that the watch had been kept unofficially and that no seizure memo had been prepared. SSP Samiullah Soomro confirmed to the Commission that the smartwatch was with SSP Zubair Nazeer Sheikh in unsealed condition.
12.08.2026	Afternoon	At NCCIA, the family was shown a seizure memo dated 31.07.2026 concerning the smartwatch. The letter notes it did not bear the signatures of the family members from whom the watch was taken and instead carried police personnel as witnesses.
13.08.2026	Not stated	The current Investigation Team recorded statements of Mir Hussain and family under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on the fifth day after the new team was constituted.
15.08.2026 — 17.08.2026	Not stated	Family repeatedly visited CPLC to review CCTV footage for 28–29 July. They raised questions regarding a white Alto and a motorcycle; the surrounding footage was incomplete or had not been secured by the previous Investigation Team.

Date	Time	Proceedings
16.08.2026	Not Stated	A statement from one security guard working on Qilla-A Street is recorded, in which he claims he heard a gunshot and came out to see where the noise came from. Muhammad Yusuf comes out at 4:37:52 am, and Mir is still seen alive and walking at 4:38:27am.
17.08.2026	Not stated	CPLC confirmed to the family that IPDR data showed Mir Raza had communicated through iMessage and accessed an Apple Maps link before his disappearance.
17.08.2026	Not stated	Chemical report on samples collected by the Special Medical Board confirmed gunshot residue on swabs from both hands of Mir Raza.
17.08.2026	Not stated	Salwa Khan's 161 statement was recorded on video by the current Investigation Team at P.S. Ferozabad and describes the questioning as focusing on Mir Raza's mental state, alleged debts, family circumstances, online trading, and far-fetched imaginary scenarios, asking Salwa which scenario she would refuse to marry Mir Raza—also told Salwa that the investigation has kept the possibility of suicide open.
17.08.2026	Not Stated	161 statements of multiple friends and colleagues of Mir Raza recorded on camera again, with a focus on alleged debts, online trading, mental health, and drug addictions.

Date	Time	Proceedings
17.08.2026	Evening	Dr. Osama Sheikh's 161 statement recorded on camera in the presence of DIG Amir Farooqi. Mention of his meeting at the CM house was edited out and not recorded. Dr. Osama was intimidated as he was told: "Dr. Summaiya became a heroine, and Jibran Nasir became a hero, and you got nothing, and if you like carrying the burden of others so much, the CM will come and kick you out."
18.08.2026	Night	Inspector Muhammad Ali took Salwa Khan's phone. Initially, a seizure memo was not made. Later, on the intervention of Advocate Jibran Nasir, Inspector Muhammad Ali returned with the phone and prepared a seizure memo.
18.08.2026	Not stated	Sindh Police issued an official statement on the investigation, noting that the medical and chemical reports are unclear and the Investigation Team needs clarity, thereby raising unnecessary controversy and doubt about the Special Medical Board findings.
19.08.2026	Not stated	Counsel for Mir Hussain and Mariam Hussain addressed the present letter to the Chief Minister Sindh seeking direct supervision of the investigation, criminal and departmental inquiry into alleged investigative lapses, and interim suspension/removal of concerned officers from sensitive duties, failing which formation of JIT.

Date	Time	Proceedings
20.08.2026	Afternoon	Mariam Hussain applies for a duplicate SIM of Mir Raza in the presence of the Investigation Team, which is received and handed to the Police the same day.
20.08.2026 – 21.08.2026	Not Stated	DIG Amir Farooqi meets Police Surgeon Dr. Summaiya and tells her that if the Special Medical Board does not exclude suicide as a possible manner of death, he will make sure her interrogation is made easy.
Sometime after 20.08.2026	Not Stated	A syrup-like bottle and a “Spring” are recovered from the site where the body was found. Note: Spring could be spray, and the mention of Spring could be a spelling mistake in the Challan.
21.08.2026	Not Stated	The Investigation Team released a video package to the media titled Mir Raza’s last 12 hours, with the 12 hours culminating at 4:38 am on 28.07.2026, when Mir Raza was last seen on CCTV.
Sometime between 18.08.2026 and 24.08.2026	Not Stated	Salwa, through the web version of WhatsApp, sees that her chats with Mir Raza have been exported to DSP Sirajuddin Lashari’s number.
24.08.2026	Afternoon	Judicial Commission notified.
24.08.2026	Not State	Alishaz Mushtaq 161 statement recorded. Most claims that Mir Raza asked for money and lied about

Date	Time	Proceedings
		his financial troubles are hearsay and attributed to Faiz-ur-Rehman. Faiz-ur-Rehman denied all claims Alishaz made in his name before the Commission.
24.08.2026	Not Stated	Screenshots of a WhatsApp chat between Salwa Khan and Mir Raza aired on a journalist's YouTube channel.
25.08.2026	Not Stated	Faiz-ur-Rehman's 161 statement recorded. Mir Raza asked Aqib for money, attributed to Faiz-ur-Rehman, though Alishaz gave that information to the police. Police did not ask Faiz-ur-Rehman to confirm claims Alishaz Mushtaq made in his name.
31.08.2026	Not stated	The Police Surgeon's office issues the Exhumation Board's unanimous opinion that a gunshot wound caused death. It found cardiac rupture from a perforating chest injury (entry on the back, exit at the front) and called the findings inconsistent with suicide.
01.09.2026	Afternoon	Dr. Osama Sheikh deposes before the Commission
09.09.2026	Morning	Investigation Team informs family that they have received Binance data of Mir Raza.
09.09.2026	Afternoon	Binance Data leaked to the media
15.09.2026	Afternoon	Dr. Osama Sheikh gives an interview to ARY after appearing before the Commission regarding a mobile snatching incident involving a journalist.

Date	Time	Proceedings
16.09.2026	Not Stated	The Investigation Team called Dr. Osama Sheikh to record a further 161 statement in light of claims made in the media.
Sometime after 16.09.2026	Not Stated	DIG Amir Farooqi wrote to the Health Department for formation of Super Medical Board/Provincial Medical Board to review findings of the Special Medical Board as confirmed to the Commission by new DG Health Sheryar Gul Memon

Suicide vs. Murder Controversy

The controversy arose when a death initially classified as suicide was later said to be a murder. The police persisted with the suicide theory even though it could not be reconciled with the second postmortem report, and this position was reinforced by the conduct of Dr. Osama and those associated with him. The leak of selected digital evidence to the media, apparently from police sources, fueled public speculation and gave rise to an anti-government narrative. Regardless of whether the death was a suicide or a murder, the police were duty-bound to investigate it thoroughly and professionally.

The police hypothesis rested on a few unconfirmed and unsubstantiated text messages, selective video footage obtained by SHO Adeel Afzaal, and Dr. Osama Shaikh's first postmortem report, which did not itself conclude suicide. It also relied on that report's observation that the exit wound was smaller than the entry wound. This observation was proved wrong in the second postmortem report, issued by Dr. Osama Shaikh himself, and even had it been accurate, it would not follow that a person cannot be murdered by a shot fired from the front. The bullet trajectory, the unusual location of the wound for a self-inflicted injury, the

absence of blood, the state of the body, the principles of medical jurisprudence, and the acid burns all clearly excluded suicide as the cause of death. It was a murder. Releasing the police findings before a proper investigation was premature and fell short of professional standards. Even if the death had been a suicide, the police should have established who was responsible for driving a young man to that point, including whether coercion, blackmail, or instigation was involved. They made no such effort. The police investigation failed in its most basic duty: to establish the truth.

Suicide because of financial distress

The record shows the creditors/investor position as follows:

Creditors/Investors

Person	Amount	Details	Source
Abdullah Bhardey	Rs 7.5 lakh	Personal loan for Bitcoin, separate from Wafflix. Also, a pending chocolate vendor invoice of Rs 22,000.	Abdullah Bhardey
Hasan Khan Tanoli	Rs 75 lakh	Cash handed over on 2 Feb for a chocolate container purchase of Wafflix. Two post-dated cheques (Rs 50 lakh and Rs 25 lakh, dated 22 June). They remained unpaid after Eid, and Raza offered instalments. Earlier loans (Rs 5 lakh, Rs 10 lakh) were repaid. However, Ahmed Bhardey says Tanoli told him on 28 July that Raza owed Rs 50	Tanoli Ahmed Bhardey

		lakh. Tanoli says he made one call and never demanded repayment.	
Asad Ali Butt	Rs 25 lakh	Agreement of 17 Dec 2025 at 60% annualized, with Rs 40 lakh to come back by Dec 2026 and a Rs 40 lakh security cheque. Two payments of Rs 7 lakh were received, the last in March. On 27 July, he also messaged Raza asking for partial payment toward a car repair. While both signed a contract, Ahmed says Asad told him on the evening of 28 July that Raza owed him this and refused to get involved.	Asad Ali Butt Ahmed Bhardey
Abid and Asif Sumar	About Rs 1.45- 1.5 crore in Wafflix, plus Rs 1.5 crore in Raza Car	Wafflix: Rs 70 lakh at 7% of sales (2024) and Rs 75 lakh at 3% (2025). Raza Car: Rs 50 lakh initially, then Rs 1 crore around Feb-Mar 2026. Returns stopped from April 2026, and a two-month grace period was agreed.	Abid Sumar (Asif adopts it), Ahmed Bhardey
Ahmed Ahsan	Rs 30 lakh	Paid on 4-5 July 2026. Rs 382,240 of it was routed through Usman Bozai's account; the rest was paid through Two personal cheques of Rs 10 lakh each from Raza. Two Wafflix cheques of Rs 5 lakh were never delivered.	Ahmed Ahsan

		The agreement is available, signed by both Ahmed and Raza.	
Ahsan Anees Shamsi	Rs 50 lakh	Agreement with Ahmed and Raza, both on 14 March 2026, for a 30% stake. Rs 5 lakh advance and Rs 45 lakh cash. Ahmed claimed Raza took cash home.	Ahsan Shamsi Ahmed Bhardey
Apple Watch notes	"A list of commercial creditors" and "Rs 3 crore"	One note listed creditors and the other read "I need 3 crore rupees, and this is for my life and death", with no recipient named.	Ahmed Bhardey, Abdullah Bhardey, Abdul Raziq (saw two notes)
Staff salaries	Not specified	Kazim says June and July were pending. Sherry says salaries were delayed for 2-3 months and that Ahmed paid him Rs 20,000 afterwards.	Kazim, Sherry
Cash taken from the till	Rs 39,000	Raza took it at closing on 28 July around 3.10 am. The amount was around Rs. 39,000.	Sherry, Kazim

Person	Amount	Details	Source
Abdullah Bhardey	Rs 7.5 lakh	Personal loan for Bitcoin, separate from Wafflix. Also a	Abdullah Bhardey

		pending chocolate vendor invoice of Rs 22,000.	
Hasan Khan Tanoli	Rs 75 lakh	Cash handed over on 2 Feb for a chocolate-container purchase. Two post-dated cheques (Rs 50 lakh and Rs 25 lakh, dated 22 June). Unpaid after Eid, and Raza offered instalments. Earlier loans (Rs 5 lakh, Rs 10 lakh) were repaid.	Tanoli
Hasan Khan Tanoli (disputed)	Rs 50 lakh	Ahmed Bhardey says Tanoli told him on 28 July that Raza owed Rs 50 lakh. Tanoli says he made one concerning call and never demanded repayment.	Ahmed Bhardey, Tanoli
Asad Ali Butt	Rs 25 lakh	Agreement of 17 Dec 2025 at 60% annualized, with Rs 40 lakh to come back by Dec 2026 and a Rs 40 lakh security cheque. Two payments of Rs 7 lakh were received, the last in March. On 27 July, he also messaged Raza asking for partial payment toward a car repair.	Asad Ali Butt

Asad Ali Butt (as reported by Ahmed)	Rs 25 lakh	Ahmed says Asad told him on the evening of 28 July that Raza owed him this.	Ahmed Bhardey
Abid and Asif Sumar	About Rs 1.45-1.5 crore in Wafflix, plus Rs 1.5 crore in Raza Car	Wafflix: Rs 70 lakh at 7% of sales (2024) and Rs 75 lakh at 3% (2025). Raza Car: Rs 50 lakh initially, then Rs 1 crore around Feb-Mar 2026. Returns stopped from April 2026, and a two-month grace period was agreed.	Abid Sumar (Asif adopts it), Ahmed Bhardey
Ahmed Ahsan	Rs 30 lakh	Paid 4-5 July 2026. Rs 382,240 of it was routed through Usman Bozai's account—two personal cheques of Rs 10 lakh each from Raza. Two Wafflix cheques of Rs 5 lakh were never delivered.	Ahmed Ahsan
Ahsan Anees Shamsi	Rs 50 lakh	Agreement of 14 March 2026 for a 30% stake. Rs 5 lakh advance and Rs 45 lakh cash, which Raza took home. Sherry says he never heard of an "Ehsan Anees Shamsi".	Ahmed Bhardey, Sherry
Faiz-ur-Rehman	Rs 2 lakh	Advanced 1 June 2025 and repaid in full on 30 June 2025.	Faiz-ur-Rehman

Noor Khan	Amount not given	The only lender, Raza, named Ahmed, who says Noor Khan pressured him.	Ahmed Bhardey
Raza's father's creditors	Amount not given	Ahmed Bhardey says a lost PPF container created the debt. He mortgaged property papers and two car files, and his mother sold gold and cashed her provident fund. Ahmed says creditors came to the house.	Ahmed Bhardey
Apple Watch notes	"A list of commercial creditors" and "Rs 3 crore"	One note listed creditors, and the other read "I need 3 crore rupees, and this is for my life and death," with no recipient named.	Ahmed Bhardey, Abdullah Bhardey, Abdul Raziq (saw two notes)
Crypto	Positions of Rs 20-30 lakh	Ahmed says Raza traded more heavily in the last four months. Raziq says the most he ever saw was about \$8,000 unrealized loss and \$15,000 profit.	Ahmed Bhardey, Raziq

Vendors	Not specified	Pending payments to Abdullah, Chef Umair, Printex, and two other vendors.	Ahmed Bhardey, Abdullah Bhardey
Staff salaries	Not specified	Kazim says June and July were pending. Sherry says salaries were delayed for 2-3 months and that Ahmed paid him Rs 20,000 afterwards.	Kazim, Sherry

General Comment

I do not think any creditor/investor has it in them to procure and administer anesthesia to a person, procure and use acid, or even use a weapon effectively. I believe, however, that the friends, particularly the Bhardey brothers, know much more than they have let known. Their conduct has raised suspicions.

The police prematurely gave the impression that Mir Raza had committed suicide because of financial distress. This theory was based on:

- i) a list of creditors recovered from Raza's Apple Watch
- ii) a Voice Note sent to Ali Shaz
- iii) a WhatsApp message sent to Sarim Bin Tahir
- iv) CCTV footage shows Mir Raza taking a pistol from Wafflix and
- v) parents' personal relationship and financial concerns at home.

List of creditors

A list of creditors/investors on his Apple Watch did not mean much.

Ali Shaz Voice Note

This is one of the most suspicious parts of this case. Ali Shaz provided an eight-month-old voice note to ASP Nida Junaid, who then sent it to SSP Soomro. The Voice Note was leaked to the media. Ali Shaz, coupled with ASP Nida Junaid, played a very important role in supporting the police narrative that the death was due to suicide. He apparently also told ASP Nida, "I can also bring 20 more people." The money was never given to Mir Raza. The person Ali Shaz named as his source of information, i.e., Faiz-ur-Rehman, told the Commission that he had not told Ali Shaz what Ali Shaz had told the police. Ali Shaz's conduct raises suspicion.

WhatsApp message sent to Sarim Bin Tahir.

Sarim Bin Tahir told the Commission that at about 12:15 to 12:25 AM on 28 July, shortly after a call in which Raza had sounded anxious and asked to discuss an "investment proposition", he sent Sarim a long WhatsApp message asking for Rs. 3 crores. Sarim says it was full of uncharacteristic grammatical errors and truncated spellings and read as acute panic.

Despite their calm phone call, Raza couldn't meet the next day because his life depended on it; he didn't know how to face the situation; something terrible was about to happen; and he asked whether the sum was large or small for Sarim.

The message did not call the Rs. 3 crore an investment or a loan, and Sarim took it as a desperate request for emergency money. Sarim politely refused, offering only strategic or operational guidance, and Raza deleted the message from the chat as soon as Sarim refused, though Sarim had already copied the text.

The wording of the note found on Raza's Apple Watch ("I need 3 crore rupees, and this is for my life and death", with no recipient named) is similar but not identical, so it is not certain that the two are the same message.

This message suggested that Mir Raza was being blackmailed or threatened. This “someone” has not been found by the police until now.

CCTV footage showing Mir Raza taking a pistol from Wafflix

This was unusual. All his close friends and associates told the Commission that Raza did not possess or use pistols. They said he would probably not even know how to handle one. Witnesses also vouched for his peace-loving, calm, and gentle demeanour. Why he took the pistol remained a mystery. The pistol, however, has not been found to date. The shell found at the crime scene did not match the pistol, though, and the pistol’s holster was found by the police in suspicious conditions and does not reconcile with Mir Raza carrying and using the pistol where his body was found.

Parents' relationship and financial distress

The known financial distress was also not of such a nature that would lead a person to suicide. Raza’s behaviour, until the ride-hailing service dropped him off, did not suggest he was ready to take an extreme step for this reason. The WhatsApp message to Sarim, which Sarim confirmed, however, raised concerns and was an investigative lead.

Binance and Cryptocurrency

The Binance report, collected and provided to the Commission by journalists, and not the police, records P2P purchases of PKR 62,034,037 and sales of PKR 27,037,420, totalling PKR 89,071,457 (8.91 crore) in gross activity, not an account balance or confirmed loss. Purchases were reportedly bank-funded, with funds moving into futures within seconds.

A reported futures loss of 139,849 USDT requires verification. P2P counterparties include IDs 1042507913 (The_Roman_786), 577245144 (Sherry

Team Worries), and 558777692 (khantahamubeen); these are profile nicknames, not verified identities. Three withdrawals totalling 1,050 USDT are associated with 182457107 (nickname not provided). Deposits of 14,450 USDT and withdrawals of 11,634 USDT are also recorded, with TRON/BSC transfer references.

Original Binance records, futures ledgers, bank statements, transaction hashes, receiving wallets, and counterparty identities require independent reconciliation. The activity alone establishes neither wrongdoing nor financial distress, the ultimate destination of funds, or any connection to Mir Raza Ali Khan's death.

The meeting at the Chief Minister's House

On August 9, 2026, officials met at the Chief Minister's House. Dr. Osama attended at the request of the Additional Inspector General of Police, Karachi, and several other senior police officers were also present. The meeting drew considerable speculation and controversy, with some tacitly suggesting it was convened to pressure Dr. Osama to defend his initial report or provide one favorable to the police. However, no evidence has emerged to indicate that this was the intention. The Chief Minister's House also serves as a secretariat, and the Chief Minister, as the executive head of the province, was fully entitled to seek a briefing from senior police officers on a case that had attracted significant media attention. That said, in the interest of transparency, it would have been prudent to invite the Police Surgeon to the meeting as well, which was not done. Nevertheless, no ulterior motive or adverse inference can be inferred from this meeting. No witness who recorded statements remotely suggested that they were influenced by any person acting for or on behalf of the Chief Minister, Sindh. Dr. Osama, through his acts and conduct, however, continued attempting to make the Chief Minister's House controversial, as indeed did he to defame and malign the Police Surgeon.

Special Medical Board formation controversy

August 6 (Court Order): Following a petition by the victim's family, the court authorized the exhumation under Section 176(2) of the CrPC. It directed the Karachi Police Surgeon and the Sindh Health Secretary to form a highly specialized medico-legal board.

August 6 (Board 1 Formed): An 8-member board headed by Karachi Police Surgeon Dr. Summaiya Syed was officially notified.

August 7 (The Midnight Reconstitution & Delay): In the early hours of Friday, the Sindh Health Directorate unilaterally issued a new notification, replacing the original experts with a trimmed 5-member board heavily featuring doctors from Hyderabad and Jamshoro. Mir Raza's family formally rejected the modified board at the graveyard, postponing the exhumation.

August 8 (Restoration & Procedure): Following heavy public pressure and a legal notice by the family, the Sindh government restored the original 8-member medical board. The exhumation was completed at 11:00 AM on August 8.

DG Pervez Ahmed Shaikh claimed he did not act independently. He testified that the Special Secretary of Health, Shahryar Memon, gave all directions to dissolve the court-approved board. He stated that Memon phoned him while he was traveling from Karachi to Hyderabad and dictated the exact names of the new doctors to be put on the board.

When asked why he bypassed a judicial order to change the board overnight, the DG claimed the Special Secretary told him a "*court order required a new board.*" The Commission corrected him, pointing out that the court ordered the board to be *made*, not *overturned*, and asked why he didn't find the overnight directive highly suspicious. He admitted that he was sceptical about the inclusion of doctors from Hyderabad and Jamshoro but went along with what the Special

Secretary told him. The DG initially testified that he "was completely unaware" that the Karachi Police Surgeon had already validly constituted the first board.

The overnight bureaucratic maneuvering was a highly irregular, inexplicable, legally flawed overreach dictated entirely from the upper echelons of the Sindh Health Secretariat, more specifically by the Secretary and Special Secretary, Health, while the DG Health Services, being aware that he was not legally competent to form a Medical Board for exhumation, looked the other way. The two gentlemen who directed the change in the Board could not give a cogent reason for the abrupt change, making it extremely controversial, fueling public speculation, and embarrassing the Sindh Government.

TOR 2: Determine whether the investigation is being conducted impartially and in accordance with law, and identify any investigative angle or evidence requiring further investigation.

The Investigation (*All observations are based on witness statements and the record provided to the Commission*)

A criminal investigation is the process of identifying, collecting, preserving, and presenting evidence in court. Section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) defines investigation as all proceedings under the Code for collecting evidence, conducted by a police officer or a person authorized by a Magistrate for that purpose. The investigating officer is strictly confined to collecting evidence and is not authorized to formulate an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 defines “evidence” as "anything that tends to prove or disprove anything." The Order also classifies evidence as (a) Oral Evidence: All statements permitted or required by the court to be made before it by a witness in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; and (b) Documentary Evidence: All documents produced for the inspection of the court.

This case demonstrates an epic failure by the police in their investigation. The police breached all required procedures, both knowingly and unknowingly, necessary to withstand judicial scrutiny and a successful prosecution. The initial police response when they were informed of the presence of a dead body was prompt. Subsequent events, however, left a lot to be desired.

The lack of leadership and ownership of the investigation is clearly demonstrated. The initial police response, crime scene securing, collection and preservation of evidence, recording of statements, preparation of seizure and recovery memos, other memos, and the inquest report were all handled in an extremely unprofessional manner. This will make it very difficult to secure a successful prosecution. The case was damaged in the first week of this incident. In many situations, e.g., CCTV recordings, the lapses made will remain unrectifiable.

No police officer took ownership of the case or led from the front. Dozens of police officers, most of whom were not properly assigned, conducted the investigation. Each on his own. Coordination between the police and the medico-legal department completely broke down. Leaders of the investigating teams were either not informed or looked the other way as their subordinates committed major lapses on the ground. The police's state of denial of blatant and obvious investigation lapses is clear from the replies furnished to the Commission by DIG Farooqi and DIG Lanjar. One member of the investigation team was not in Karachi throughout the investigation period. Another seemed to spend more time in the interior regions of Sindh on other cases rather than working on this case. The police had no strategy for the case. This was also reflected in their silence in answering the family's questions and keeping them abreast of developments. No official person was appointed for this purpose. The communication breakdown led to public speculation, which negatively impacted public confidence.

Incessant public criticism of the police created further problems. It seems that the police went into a shell, completely broke down communication channels, and took a position based on ego rather than on cogent, solid reasons. The police became an adversary, which impacted their impartiality and professionalism.

The place where the dead body was found

"Every contact leaves a trace" is a foundational principle in forensic science. Investigators must examine a scene with meticulous care for several critical reasons. Physical evidence is highly vulnerable immediately after a crime occurs. Environmental elements (like rain, wind, or heat), active emergency responders (like the Edhi volunteers, 15 personnel, and gardeners), and curious bystanders can easily alter a scene. Close observation helps investigators ensure transient clues like hair, fibers, blood splatters, gunshot residue, fingerprints, and DNA are not trampled, smudged, or mixed with external materials. Proper crime scene

observation and recording also help detect staging, when someone intentionally alters a scene to mislead police.

For an investigation to lead to a successful conviction, the evidence must stand up in court. If investigators observe a scene poorly or manage it haphazardly, the defense can argue the evidence was contaminated, misplaced, or handled improperly. Thorough initial observation, paired with precise documentation (photography, measurements, and sketches), builds an unbroken chain of custody that bridges the gap between probable cause and proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mir Raza's dead body was lying on an elevated surface and was not seen by any police official, despite their presence. The task of observing the dead body and bringing it to lower ground was performed by the Edhi ambulance workers and gardeners from a nearby nursery. The police did not take photographs or videos of the scene before anything was moved, nor did they make any sketches or measurements of the layout. No one recorded the body's position or condition. While the dead body was in its initial position, no effort was made to collect and preserve physical evidence: weapons, bullet casings, fingerprints, DNA, fibers, blood patterns, digital devices, or any other item that could be beneficial to the investigation. The crime scene was not quickly secured with cordons, and no log was kept of everyone who entered or left to prevent contamination or loss of evidence.

Police Rule 25.10 requires that the police officer who first proceeds to the spot shall, if he be not competent to complete the investigation, take all possible steps to preserve the scene of the crime from disturbance, to record particulars of, and secure the presence of witnesses, and obtain information relating to the case.

Police Rule 25.13(iii), in cases of murder, requires the police officer investigating the case, if he considers it necessary, to have the crime scene sketched.

Police Rule 25.13B (3) requires the investigating officer to ensure: (a) photography of the crime scene (b) geo-tagging of the crime scene with a smartphone (c) collection of physical evidence and trace evidence (d) packaging of physical evidence (e) lifting of fingerprints and footprints; and (f) securing any other evidence.

None of the above Rules was complied with by the police at the place where the dead body was placed originally. Once the dead body was brought down, the Talaash app personnel did attempt to obtain fingerprints, but failed. Some ineffective photos were taken of the body by the police when it was brought down. Photos of the dead body at the place where it was found were not official photos taken in the investigation. Edhi volunteers have testified that the dead body's fist was closed with grass inside it and that they themselves tried to open the fist but failed. Important evidence, in the shape of what the fist held, was lost.

Some evidence suggests that the Crime Scene Unit, which first arrived on July 30, 2026, may have secured the crime scene temporarily; however, it was too late to play an effective role. Dozens of police officials, including several from different police stations, visited, inspected, and searched the crime scene. The crime scene was left unsecured and trampled by dozens of police officers. As a result, the integrity of the forensic investigation and crucial trace evidence such as DNA, fingerprints, blood, and footwear impressions were completely compromised and irreversibly destroyed. The crime scene was deliberately burnt to find evidence, compounding this catastrophe. The burning of the crime scene could also be categorized as a criminal act.

The postmortem findings (whether the first or the second) confirm a fatal wound to the heart, which medically necessitates an immediate external blood loss of approximately 1 to 2 liters. No blood pooling was present around the deceased's

body, save for an isolated trace on a flowerpot fragment. DIG Farooqi refuted this, claiming that the volume of blood found at a site depends on the body's position. Even if DIG Farooqi is correct, burning the site left this controversy unresolved. I.O. Shabeer Leghari's testimony is internally inconsistent with DIG Farooqi's; Leghari alleged soil absorption while also affirming the body lay on stones. Furthermore, the mandatory forensic procedure for collecting blood-soaked soil samples was entirely omitted.

The lack of primary biological evidence at the recovery site fails to preclude—and instead strongly corroborates—the hypothesis that the deceased was murdered elsewhere and subsequently dumped at the location.

CCTV Evidence Collection

An analysis of the crime scene topography reveals at least nine potential ingress and egress routes leading directly to the location where the deceased's body was discovered. Despite at least 52 surveillance cameras (by some estimates, in the hundreds) installed in the immediate vicinity, the local investigation team demonstrated systemic negligence by collecting footage from only the route that Mir Raza had walked on before his death.

This selective approach was explicitly conceded during cross-examination:

- i. SSP Soomro admitted to being unaware of the multi-route topography and acknowledged that footage from only a single street was secured.
- ii. SHO Adeel Afzaal offered a similar admission of localized and incomplete collection.
- iii. Investigating Officer (I.O.) Shabeer Leghari, the primary official tasked with the inquiry, demonstrated a complete lack of familiarity with these critical geographical and evidentiary parameters.

The police's narrative relies on a highly curated and ultimately unsubstantiated selection of video data. The police initially asserted that CCTV footage depicts the deceased, Mir Raza, discarding his mobile phone—a claim proven false during these proceedings. Crucially, the subsequent footage capturing the individual who retrieved the said mobile phone is mysteriously absent from the case file.

A similar evidentiary gap exists regarding the Masjid Khizra surveillance system, which was vital for mapping the timeline immediately following Mir Raza's last known movements. The police preserved only two isolated segments: one depicting a scavenger retrieving an unidentified object, and another showing the discovery of the body. The police alleged that this scavenger retrieved the firearm used by Mir Raza to commit suicide. However, a comprehensive review of the relevant footage reveals:

- i. Around 07:00 hours, an unidentified male carrying a green bag is seen approaching the area. He returned approximately one hour later, discarded the bag, and remained near the corpse for 3 to 3½ minutes before departing.
- ii. Due to dense vegetation and large potted plants measuring approximately 6 to 7 feet in height, the camera's line of sight was substantially obstructed. It is objectively impossible to verify whether this individual observed, touched, or tampered with the body.
- iii. While police subsequently interrogated 30 to 35 local drug addicts to establish the individual's identity, the effort yielded no actionable intelligence.

The police have attempted to utilize this ambiguous footage to explain why the weapon was never recovered at the scene. In reality, the preserved recording fails to substantiate the police's foundational hypothesis of suicide, and the firearm remains unrecovered.

DSP Siraj Lashari claimed that the footage from Masjid Khizra's most crucial camera could not be obtained because of a power breakdown between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m. on July 28, 2026. K-Electric's confirmation proved this claim false.

The collection, handling, and preservation of the digital evidence in this matter suffered from fatal procedural deficits, enumerated as follows:

- i. The police failed to execute formal seizure memos for critical, screen-recorded CCTV clips.
- ii. Original Digital Video Recorders (DVRs) were not legally secured or confiscated from multiple commercial venues, including several locations on Tariq Road.
- iii. Multiple video recordings were crudely captured by police personnel using personal mobile phone cameras to film external playback monitors.
- iv. Digital files were improperly transferred to, and stored on, personal mobile devices and unauthorized USB flash drives, entirely compromising the chain of custody.
- v. The official record contains highly contradictory accounts regarding the extraction and collection of the DVR from the guest-house location.
- vi. Essential investigative actions concerning digital data retrieval remained completely unrecorded in the daily police or case diaries.
- vii. The police cannot definitively identify or verify which specific surveillance systems produced several of the clips entered into the record.
- viii. The footage sourced from Agha Juice fails to identify a depicted "glowing object," and no supplementary footage was secured to identify the person who later removed it.

The operational history of this investigation raises a strong legal presumption that the police selectively preserved only the footage that advanced their

predetermined narrative, while allowing vital exculpatory evidence to be overwritten or destroyed.

Consequently, the reckless and substandard manner in which this digital evidence was intercepted, handled, and logged violates the strict statutory frameworks and evidentiary benchmarks laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Because of these fatal breaks in the chain of custody and the lack of forensic integrity, this entire body of CCTV evidence is inadmissible at trial, severely—if not fatally—prejudicing the prospects of a successful prosecution based on this footage.

Two different descriptions of the scale of the CCTV collection exist. According to SHO Adeel Afzal's account

- i. 9 CCTV locations along Tariq Road were inspected.
- ii. Approximately 20–25 cameras existed along that thoroughfare.
- iii. Several cameras covered only pedestrian footpaths, not the main carriageway.
- iv. The team captured 6 recordings from display monitors.
- v. PC Noman used his mobile phone to record the screens.
- vi. No formal seizure memos were prepared.
- vii. No original DVRs were seized from those nine Tariq Road locations.

The resulting video files were retained on mobile phones and USB drives. Adeel specifically disputes the claim that hundreds of CCTV recordings were collected in the presence of Ahmed Bhardey's counsel. According to SSP Soomro, the police reportedly reviewed over 30 camera points along the route from the Bykea/taxi drop-off area toward the recovery location. CCTV extraction was coordinated through focal persons including PC Noman and an officer named Kashif from SSP East. However, all the witnesses said that they did not personally seize CCTV equipment or execute physical seizure memos. Specific CCTV footage was freely disseminated through leaks while in police custody. DIG

Farooqi claimed that all leaks happened before his team took over. Evidence shows otherwise.

The mobile phone

The recovery of Mir Raza's mobile phone is shrouded in mystery and riddled with contradictory statements. SHO Adeel Afzaal claimed that CCTV footage recorded at 4:38 a.m. shows Raza throwing a "glowing object" into a drainage ditch, which he said was his mobile phone. However, SSP Soomro countered that the footage does not definitively identify the object. SHO Adeel Afzaal, too, in a confused and unsure state of mind, at times in his statement, also seemed to support SSP Soomro's theory.

Further complicating the matter, official police records state that two laborers, Sajid and Sajjad, found the phone near the BRT Track on Main University Road. The identities of these laborers remain highly doubtful, as police repeatedly altered the documented parentage of one of them. Furthermore, ASI Faisal's involvement is highly suspicious; he was not an authorized investigating officer and appears to have been brought into the case as an afterthought much later to draft seizure memos (he is also the author of the seizure of the Apple Watch taken from the family). His presence at either place where the seizure was made seems to be a misrepresentation. Finally, the chain of custody was severely compromised: the phone was never sealed, no forensic report was ever submitted to the Commission, and the Call Data Records (CDR) were similarly withheld. Concerned citizens sent some records to the Commission.

The police narrative on how the iPhone was recovered is dubious and appears to be an afterthought. Specifically, unauthorized, repeated passcode entries by personnel triggered security lockout mechanisms, rendering the device data permanently unrecoverable. Consequently, critical digital evidence was

effectively destroyed, severely impacting the viability of the investigation and subsequent legal proceedings.

The Apple Watch

The subject Apple Watch was critical evidence, but law enforcement's failure to maintain a proper chain of custody compromised its integrity. SHO Adeel Afzaal took the Watch from Alishba on July 31, 2026. Later, he asked her for the password. It seems that after that, many police officers handled the Watch and its contents freely, and selective data leaked to the media. Despite receiving the correct iCloud credentials from the family, personnel made repeated, unauthorized login attempts that triggered a security lockout. This gross negligence effectively obstructed data recovery, forcing a reliance on outstanding data requests from Meta.

Vehicles

The police made no meaningful investigation. The investigation that was conducted remained undocumented. Extensive and meaningful CCTV footage was available with some crime journalists; however, the police did not accept their offer to take it.

Paperwork

Most witness statements were recorded crudely and unprofessionally. For a substantial number of witnesses, unauthorized persons recorded statements, and the investigating officer admittedly merely rubber-stamped them. Statements were inexplicably recorded late. The recorded statements focused only on financial issues, which seems to reflect the police's desire to establish financial distress as the cause of death. Many witnesses who came to the Commission denied saying what their statements contained. Several witnesses said that the police were harsh with him; one was abused, while SHO Adeel Afzaal told Mir

Raza's friends that they should not condole with the family, join protests, or go to the soyem. The police did not prepare seizure memos, and the few they produced before the Commission are dubious.

Samples

Samples of viscera that were given to the police after the post-mortem were handled in a crude, unscientific, and unprofessional manner. The samples remained at the police station for a substantial period for no logical reason. The evidentiary value of those samples was therefore destroyed.

Leakage of digital data

The police selectively and unlawfully leaked data collected from digital sources to the media. This not only reflected improper handling of the data, but also created public speculation that caused unrest amongst society. The leakage of private and unrelated data caused humiliation and shame for the family. The police provided no official briefing to mitigate speculation. The Commission's request that the police appoint a focal person remained unaddressed.

A broad overview of the investigation

Incessant public criticism of the police created problems. It seems that the police went into a shell, completely broke down communication channels, and took a position based on ego rather than on cogent, solid reasons. The police became an adversary, which impacted their impartiality and professionalism. The following observations are made:

- i. Lack of leadership, seriousness, and supervision, and, in some cases, negligence by the senior officers. The handling of this case has been like a rudderless ship, not aware of its destination.

- ii. Ranging from negligent to criminally negligent, inexplicable, casual, and unprofessional investigation. An active cover-up in the initial stages of the investigation cannot be conclusively ruled out. Senior police officers swept clear investigative lapses under the carpet, without acknowledging them, addressing them, or even attempting to do so.
- iii. Senior police officers demonstrated tunnel vision. They focused so hard on one single goal or problem that they ignored everything else and failed to see the bigger picture.
- iv. Driven by ego and a desire to avoid public error, the police doubled down on their initial suicide ruling and considered the case closed, rather than investigating further.
- v. Too many cooks spoil the broth. The proverb applies to this case, at least as far as the police are concerned. Dozens of police officers – authorized and unauthorized – were involved in collecting evidence in this case, approaching and interrogating crucial persons, and in most cases not documenting it in any manner. As a result, no officer is willing to take responsibility for the lapses and instead blames subordinates.

It was essential to mitigate public speculation by an honest and timely briefing on the investigation. This was not done. The family or the public was not updated through official disclosures. The police did not follow the Commission's recommendation to appoint a focal person for this reason. As a result, public speculation further embarrassed the Government and the police.

Investigative angle or evidence requiring further investigation

1. Blackmail or a revenge killing should not be excluded from investigations.

2. The nexus between Ali Shaz, ASP Nida Junaid, ASP Shazeb Memon, and Special Secretary Shahryar Memon's nexus must be explored deeply.
3. The occupants of the Silver/Gray Car at the Guest House should be explored further. The suspicious vehicles pointed out should be investigated thoroughly.
4. SHO Adeel Afzaal should be looked at closely.
5. Dr. Osama Sheikh's connections and conduct should be explored.
6. The Bhardey brothers should be questioned extensively.
7. Crucial CCTV footage that was not obtained must be looked into.
8. The identities of the three Binance accounts with which maximum interaction took place must be established and explored.
9. How a particular anaesthetic and acid were procured must be explored.
10. Meta should be pursued for the record of the Apple Watch, in particular whether the link to a map was sent by anybody or obtained by Mir Raza himself, and what exactly the map was.
11. Who is involved in the data leakage and provision of evidence to certain social media channels should be investigated.

TOR 3: Determine whether any police officer, MLO, or any other official committed negligence, dereliction of duty, professional misconduct, suppression/manipulation of evidence, or any unlawful act, omission, or cover-up.

Observations on the police and health officials

Official	Observations
AIG Azad Khan	No material lapse found on his part. However, the investigating team members failed him.
DIG Amir Farooqi	A very capable officer. Has not performed to his potential. Lack of leadership and supervision. A tunnel vision approach. In some aspects, professional negligence. Lack of ownership of the investigation. Much respect was given to the senior officers, and questionnaires were sent to them. Two of them, DIG Farooqi and DIG Lanjar, did not return that respect. Their replies were evasive, non-serious, and stereotypical. If, after all that has been revealed in the Commission, DIG Farooqi is satisfied with the investigation, then it is cause for great concern. His position reflects denial. Similarly, DIG Lanjar has taken a casual, non-serious, offhand position. As a DIG East, it was ultimately his responsibility - a responsibility he did not perform.

Official	Observations
DIG Farukh Lanjar	Lack of leadership and supervision. Much respect was given to the senior officers and questionnaires sent to them. Two of them, DIG Farooqi and DIG Lanjar, did not return that respect. Their replies were evasive, non-serious, and stereotypical. If, after all that has been revealed in the Commission, DIG Farooqi is satisfied with the investigation, then it is cause for great concern. His position reflects denial and ego. Similarly, DIG Lanjar has taken a casual, non-serious, nonchalant position. As a DIG East, it was ultimately his responsibility - a responsibility he did not perform.
SSP Samiullah Soomro	Lack of leadership and supervision. Negligence. A casual approach to the investigation. Did not consider the legal aspects of the case. Requires training. However, gracefully admitted the lapses made.
SHO Adeel Afzaal	Criminal negligence. Initiate a comprehensive inquiry into him, leading to dismissal from service. He should be suspended in the interim. He must also be questioned to determine whether he has facilitated the destruction of key evidence.

Official	Observations
S.I. Shabbir Leghari	Criminal negligence. Initiate comprehensive disciplinary proceedings, leading to dismissal from service. He should be suspended in the interim.
SHO Kamran Qureshi	Unprofessional and unlawful conduct. Should be taken off the assignment of an SHO. Initiate comprehensive disciplinary proceedings against him. He must also be questioned to determine whether he has facilitated the destruction of key evidence.
DSP Siraj Lashari	A capable officer. In this case has not performed and missed important leads. Did not verify or question previous investigations. A tunnel vision approach. The recorded statements showed no application of mind. Justified lapses based on “this is how it is practically done”. A non-serious approach was taken.
ASP Nida Junaid	Unprofessional. Requires training. Her link with a person of interest must be inquired into to eliminate doubt about her role in this investigation.
Inspector Ghaus	Criminal negligence

Official	Observations
Dr. Osama Shaikh	Extreme immaturity. Childish behaviour. Overconfidence. Unprofessional conduct not befitting a medical professional. Must not be assigned medico-legal duties unless he has undergone at least two years of rigorous academic and practical training. He was possibly influenced. This must be conclusively determined.
Zeeshan, Head Moharar	Based on his statement recorded in the Commission, he is the only official who made Sindh police proud. He should be encouraged through appreciation and training.
PC Mohammad Arif	Diligent. Positively energetic. Should be encouraged through appreciation and training.
SSP Zubair Nazeer Shaikh (East) and SP Usman Sadozai (East)	The Commission could not request their appearance because of time constraints. However, there is little doubt that they treated the case casually and unprofessionally.
Mr. Tariq Sangi, Secretary Health	Lack of leadership and supervision.

Official	Observations
Mr. Shehryar Memon, Special Secretary Health	An inquiry must be initiated against him for suddenly and for no reason changing the Special Medical Board. He says he acted in good faith. However, there is no indication of good faith, and his directions appear to be influenced.

TOR 4: Make recommendations for further investigation, forensic analysis, or legal/departmental action.

Recommendations

1. The current handling of this case has reached a critical juncture, and subsequent police actions will inevitably face heavy public speculation. Regrettably, due to a severe breakdown in trust, even an accurate conclusion or the apprehension of the true culprit is unlikely to be accepted by the public. The police department bears responsibility for this profound trust deficit between itself and society, a divide that now appears nearly unrectifiable in this case.

Furthermore, because a significant portion of physical evidence has been compromised, the case can now only be resolved through a rigorous, intelligence-based investigation. To restore institutional credibility, the police must transparently acknowledge and apologize for past operational lapses, while immediately initiating formal inquiries against the responsible officers in light of the Commission's observations.

While unsolved crimes and complex murders occur globally, the Sindh government must firmly assure both the aggrieved family and the public that all future proceedings will be executed with absolute professionalism. Given these extraordinary circumstances, accommodating the family's request for a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) is the most viable path to mitigate ongoing reputational damage to the Government of Sindh.

To balance the need for public accountability with preserving Sindh Police morale and reputation, it is recommended that a JIT be constituted under the leadership of DIG Irfan Baloch. This team should strategically integrate senior representatives from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), and the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) to ensure an impartial,

comprehensive, and credible resolution. This extreme step is necessary to restore public trust and end speculation.

2. The Commission does not have investigative powers. It is therefore difficult to conclude conclusively that an active cover-up occurred. Indeed, certain inexplicable actions are difficult to justify and raise the possibility that one may have occurred. A high-level committee (preferably led by the FIA) should be constituted to inquire into whether any of the police officials involved in this probe in the first ten days are in breach of sections 201, 166(2) and 218 P.P.C. The committee should initiate criminal action, in addition to disciplinary proceedings, against those it finds culpable.
3. This case, and all that it has brought, is an opportunity to initiate police reform. The investigation protocol in particular needs to be addressed and modernized. It must be made more trustworthy, credible, and confidence-inspiring.

If the Government, in its wisdom, considers this suggestion favorably, then a multi-person, diverse committee of seasoned professionals should be constituted to specifically address first response, crime scene handling, medico-legal dynamics, collection, safekeeping, and analysis of evidence, and recording the entirety of the investigation in written or digital form. It would be ideal if the committee could complete this exercise within three months and implement the reform. Of course, the Sindh Government will make the final decision.

4. An increase in the investigation budget may be considered. Ensure that the requisite budget reaches the investigator. Put a protocol in place to digitally monitor an investigator's use of that fund.

5. Deploy forensic science evidence in crime scene management, collection procedures, preservation techniques, and tracking protocols.
6. Create and provide investigators with meaningful, simple handbooks that include investigative guidelines, steps to follow, and basic knowledge of the law governing investigations.
7. Require investigators to receive training in different forms of crime, advanced interrogation techniques, digital forensics, and the law governing criminal investigations. Assign investigations in each police station based on the level of training the investigator has completed.
8. The Sindh Medico Legal Act 2023 should be implemented in letter and spirit. All officials whose work requires familiarity with this Act should be made aware of it. The Rules under the Act should be made.
9. The capacity and number of Crime Scene Units should be enhanced. Establish a strong liaison with the Forensics division. Impart effective knowledge to CSU personnel. If not already done, the CSU unit should have dedicated staff and a DIG to operate it.
10. Continuing Education should preferably be initiated for senior police officials, focusing on, among others, leadership and international developments in investigation techniques.
11. The police mindset must be drilled into the fact that solving a case is very different from proving a case. In Mir Raza's case, the police have not solved it yet, but even if they do now, it will be very difficult to prove it in a court of law.