

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ON THE INQUIRY SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF MIR RAZA ALI

(Deceased on July 29, 2026; Case FIR No. 795/2026, Police Station Ferozabad, Karachi)

Submitted by:

JUSTICE OMAR SIAL

Judge, Sindh High Court

Head, Single-Member Judicial Commission of Inquiry

Submitted to:

The Chief Minister of Sindh

Government of Sindh, Karachi

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 Mandate and Scope (Terms of Reference)

The Commission was formed by the Sindh government under the Sindh Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of 25-year-old Mir Raza Ali.

The primary mandate was to determine the facts and circumstances of the case; assess whether police and medico-legal investigations were impartial; identify professional negligence, misconduct, evidence manipulation, or cover-ups; review digital/forensic evidence; and recommend further investigation, forensic analysis, or legal/departmental action.

2. Summary of Proceedings & Scope of Work

The Commission started work on August 27, 2026, and continued recording statements till October 7, 2026. In 20 sessions, the Commission recorded statements from 50 witnesses. The Commission also comprehensively explored the crime scene and its adjoining areas on October 5, 2026. To ensure transparency and reduce public speculation, the Commission held all sessions open to the public.

3. A brief background

Mir Raza Ali, a 25-year-old graduate from the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi, who subsequently started a waffle-making business under the banner Wafflix, left his home in PECHS, Karachi, in the early hours of July 28, 2026. The family reported him missing the same day at the Ferozabad police station. F.I.R. No. 795 of 2026, under section 365 P.P.C. (kidnapping), was registered the same day. On the morning of July 29, 2026, Mir Raza Ali's dead body was found within the

jurisdiction of the Gulistan-e-Johar police station. A post-mortem of the body was conducted at the Jinnah Hospital on July 29, 2026, and the body was buried the same day.

Initially, the cause of death was opined by the police to be suicide. Concerns regarding the cause of death were raised by the deceased's family, as they claimed that the body had visible torture marks. Their claim gained strength when the Police Surgeon, in early August, pointed out some anomalies in the first post-mortem report, which had been used by the police as its basis for the suicide theory. This led to the exhumation of the body on August 8, 2026. The initial findings after exhumation were shared on August 8–9, 2026, and the final official report confirming the cause of death as a perforating firearm injury from the back (ruling out suicide) was issued around August 31, 2026.

Subsequently, charges under Sections 302 P.P.C. (murder) and 201 (destruction of evidence) were also added to the F.I.R. No. 795 of 2026.

4. Suicide vs. Murder Controversy

The controversy arose when a death initially classified as suicide was later said to be a murder. The police persisted with the suicide theory even though it could not be reconciled with the second postmortem report, and this position was reinforced by the conduct of Dr. Osama and those associated with him. The leak of selected digital evidence to the media, apparently from police sources, fueled public speculation and gave rise to an anti-government narrative. Regardless of whether the death was a suicide or a murder, the police were duty-bound to investigate it thoroughly and professionally.

The police hypothesis rested on a few unconfirmed and unsubstantiated text messages, selective video footage obtained by SHO Adeel Afzaal, and Dr. Osama

Shaikh's first postmortem report, which did not itself conclude suicide. It also relied on that report's observation that the exit wound was at the back of the body and thus it was presumed that Mir Raza committed suicide by shooting himself from the front. The second postmortem report, issued by Dr. Osama Shaikh himself, contradicted this observation. Even if it had been accurate, i.e., the bullet entered the body through the front, it would not follow that a person cannot be murdered by a shot fired from the front. The bullet trajectory, the unusual location of the wound for a self-inflicted injury, the absence of blood, the state of the body, the principles of medical jurisprudence, acid burns and the anesthesia detected in the blood, all clearly excluded suicide as the cause of death. It was a murder. Releasing the police findings before a proper investigation was premature and fell short of professional standards. Even if the death had been a suicide, the police should have established who was responsible for driving a young man to that point, including whether coercion, blackmail, or instigation was involved. They made no such effort. The police investigation failed in its most basic duty: to establish the truth. The post-mortem report left no doubt that Mir Raza was murdered.

5. The meeting at the Chief Minister's House

On August 9, 2026, officials met at the Chief Minister's House. Dr. Osama attended at the request of the Additional Inspector General of Police, Karachi, and several other senior police officers were also present. The meeting drew considerable speculation and controversy, with some tacitly suggesting it was convened to pressure Dr. Osama to defend his initial report or provide one favorable to the police. However, no evidence has emerged to indicate that this was the intention. The Chief Minister's House also serves as a secretariat, and the Chief Minister, as the executive head of the province, was fully entitled to seek a briefing from senior police officers on a case that had attracted significant media attention. That said, in the interest of

transparency, it would have been prudent to invite the Police Surgeon to the meeting as well, which was not done. Nevertheless, no ulterior motive can be inferred from this meeting. No adverse inference can be drawn from the briefing itself. No witness who recorded statements remotely suggested that they were influenced by any person acting for or on behalf of the Chief Minister, Sindh. Dr. Osama, through his acts and conduct, however, continued attempting to make the Chief Minister's House controversial, as indeed did he to defame and malign the Police Surgeon.

6. Special Medical Board formation controversy

August 6 (Court Order): Following a petition by the victim's family, the court authorized the exhumation under Section 176(2) of the CrPC. It directed the Karachi Police Surgeon and the Sindh Health Secretary to form a highly specialized medico-legal board.

August 6 (Board 1 Formed): An 8-member board headed by Karachi Police Surgeon Dr. Summaiya Syed was officially notified.

August 7 (The Midnight Reconstitution & Delay): In the early hours of Friday, the Sindh Health Directorate unilaterally issued a new notification, replacing the original experts with a trimmed 5-member board heavily featuring doctors from Hyderabad and Jamshoro. Mir Raza's family formally rejected the modified board at the graveyard, postponing the exhumation.

August 8 (Restoration & Procedure): Following heavy public pressure and a legal notice by the family, the Sindh government restored the original 8-member medical board. The exhumation was completed at 11:00 AM on August 8.

The overnight bureaucratic maneuvering was a highly irregular, inexplicable, legally flawed overreach dictated entirely from the upper echelons of the Sindh Health Secretariat, more specifically by the Secretary and Special Secretary, Health, while

the DG Health Services, being aware that he was not legally competent to form a Medical Board for exhumation, looked the other way. The two gentlemen who directed the change in the Board could not give a cogent reason for the abrupt change, making it extremely controversial, fueling public speculation, and embarrassing the Sindh Government.

7. Police and Investigation Lapses *(Details in the main report)*

This case demonstrates an epic failure by the police in their investigation. The police breached all required procedures, knowingly or unknowingly, necessary to withstand judicial scrutiny and support a successful prosecution. The initial police response when they were informed of the presence of a dead body was prompt. Subsequent events, however, left a lot to be desired.

Incessant public criticism of the police created problems. It seems that the police went into a shell, completely broke down communication channels, and took a position based on ego rather than on cogent, solid reasons. The police became an adversary, which impacted their impartiality and professionalism. The following observations are made:

- i. Lack of leadership, seriousness, and supervision, and, in some cases, negligence by the senior officers. The handling of this case has been like a rudderless ship, not aware of its destination.
- ii. Ranging from negligent to criminally negligent, inexplicable, casual, and unprofessional investigation. An active cover-up in the initial stages of the investigation cannot be conclusively ruled out. Senior police officers swept clear investigative lapses under the carpet, without acknowledging them, addressing them, or even attempting to do so.

- iii. Senior police officers demonstrated tunnel vision. They focused so hard on one single goal or problem that they ignored everything else and failed to see the bigger picture.
- iv. Driven by ego and a desire to avoid public error, the police doubled down on their initial suicide ruling rather than investigating further.
- v. Too many cooks spoil the broth. The proverb is applicable to this case as far as the police are concerned. Dozens of police officers – authorized and unauthorized – were involved in collecting evidence in this case, approaching and interrogating crucial persons, and in most cases not documenting it in any manner. As a result, no officer is willing to take responsibility for the lapses and instead blames subordinates or lives in denial.
- vi. It was essential to mitigate public speculation by an honest and timely briefing on the investigation. This was not done. The family or the public was not updated through official disclosures. The police did not follow the Commission's recommendation to appoint a focal person for this reason. As a result, public speculation further embarrassed the Government and the police.

8. Accountability and Negligence

The response to TOR 3 at page 52 of the main Report has the detailed observations.

9. Key Recommendations

The response to TOR 4 at page 58 of the main Report has the detailed recommendations; however, the key recommendations are as follows.

1. The current handling of this case has reached a critical juncture, and subsequent police actions will inevitably face heavy public speculation. Regrettably, due to a severe breakdown in trust, even an accurate conclusion or the apprehension of the true culprit is unlikely to be accepted by the public. The police department bears responsibility for this profound trust deficit between itself and society, a divide that now appears nearly unrectifiable in this case.

Furthermore, because a significant portion of physical evidence has been compromised, the case can now only be resolved through a rigorous, intelligence-based investigation. To restore institutional credibility, the police must transparently acknowledge and apologize for past operational lapses, while immediately initiating formal inquiries against the responsible officers in light of the Commission's observations.

While unsolved crimes and complex murders occur globally, the Sindh government must firmly assure both the aggrieved family and the public that all future proceedings will be executed with absolute professionalism. Given these extraordinary circumstances, accommodating the family's request for a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) is the most viable path to mitigate ongoing reputational damage to the Government of Sindh.

To balance the need for public accountability with preserving Sindh Police morale and reputation, it is recommended that a JIT be constituted under the leadership of DIG Irfan Baloch. This team should strategically integrate senior

representatives from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), and the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) to ensure an impartial, comprehensive, and credible resolution. This extreme step is necessary to restore public trust and end speculation.

2. The Commission does not have investigative powers. It is therefore difficult to conclude conclusively that an active cover-up occurred. Indeed, certain inexplicable actions are difficult to justify and raise the possibility that one may have occurred at some stage. A high-level committee (preferably led by the FIA) should be constituted to inquire into whether any of the police officials involved in this probe in the first ten days are in breach of sections 201, 166(2) and 218 P.P.C. The committee should initiate criminal action, in addition to disciplinary proceedings, against those it finds culpable.